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PROFESSOR LOEWY'S "DIVERSITY" DEFENSE
OF RACIAL PREFERENCE: DEFINING
DISCRIMINATION AWAY
LiNO A. GRAGLA*

The test of lawyerly skill is the overcoming of inconvenient facts,
proving, for example, that black is white or white is black, as one's
interest requires. This skill, amazing to the layman, actually requires
no more than the redefinition of words. The inherent defect of the
rule of law, indeed, is that it depends on the meaning of words, but
words do not shout in protest when abused; their fate is entirely in
the hands of the clever and well-placed, such as famous professors of
constitutional law. "Affirmative action" faces the difficulty that,
insofar as it is controversial, it is a euphemism for racial
discrimination, and our law has made racial discrimination
exceedingly difficult to justify. Professor Loewy, skilled lawyer and
law professor that he is, has come up with a solution: a redefinition
of racial discrimination.
What appears to be racial
discrimination-making decisions on the basis of race-is not really
racial discrimination, he argues, when used to promote "diversity"
(increased racial mixing), though it would be, of course, if used to
reduce racial mixing and promote homogeneity.
I. "DIVERSITY" VERSUS "AFFIRMATIVE AcTiON"

Professor Loewy begins his argument with the assertion,
developed at some length with illustrations, that "diversity and
affirmative action are not the same thing."1 Because he does not
quote or cite anyone to the contrary, it is not clear who, if anyone, he
thinks he is refuting. His statement is literally correct, but because
undisputed, somewhat confusing. Let us try to be clear as to what is
in dispute. "Affirmative action," as already noted, is a euphemism
for racial preferences. Anyone who offers a different definition is
* A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A., City
College of New York, 1952; L.L.B., Columbia Law School, 1954.
1. Arnold H. Loewy, Taking'Bakke Seriously:

Distinguishing Diversity from

Affirmative Action in the Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1479
(1999).
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seeking to avoid, rather than confront, the only point at issue: the
"Diversity" (itself a
justifiability of racial discrimination.
euphemism), on the other hand, is one of the justifications offered for
the use of racial preferences, particularly, though not exclusively, in
the context of higher education. The argument is that the presence of
an additional black student, for example, in a classroom contributes
more to the educational program than would a person of another
race, even one with better academic credentials.
Professor Loewy uses "affirmative action" as if it were
synonymous with the justification initially offered for the use of racial
preferences: It serves to "remedy" prior racial disadvantage. That
this justification is invalid is plain enough from the fact that it is
impossible to remedy an injury to one individual caused by another in
the past by granting a benefit to a different individual at the expense
of still another in the present. It is equally obvious that if the concern
were to remedy disadvantage, then disadvantage, not race, would be
the criterion. Race is not a valid proxy for disadvantage, because not
all and not only blacks-the primary intended beneficiaries of racial
preferences-have suffered disadvantage. Indeed, blacks who apply
to selective institutions of higher education - typically, like white
applicants, children of parents of the middle or upper-middle class 2are among the most economically and educationally advantaged.
The "remedy" rationale for racial preferences has appeal, as
Professor Glenn Loury has pointed out, only because "[tihe suffering
of the poorest blacks creates, if you will, a fund of political capital
upon which all members of the group can draw when pressing
racially-based claims."3
Very few of these poorest blacks,
unfortunately, seek admission to selective colleges and universities,
and it would be difficult to think of a program less directed to helping
them than preferential admission to such institutions. If anything,
such programs serve to divert attention from efforts that could be
helpful, such as seeking means to improve education in our inner-city
schools.
The fraudulence of the remedy rationale for racial
preferences in higher education is further illustrated by the fact that
2- See, e.g., Stephen Magagnini, Minority Drop Stirs Up Regents, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 19, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 8827896. Henna Hill Kay, Dean of the
University of California at Berkeley Law School, reported that a group of 150
"socioeconomically deprived" applicants included no blacks. Id. None qualified as
socioeconomically deprived, she said, "'generally because African Americans who apply
to our law school are not disadvantaged. Their mothers and fathers are professionals with
good family incomes.'" Id. (quoting Dean Kay).
3. Glenn C. Loury, The Moral Quandary of the Black Community, PUB. INTEREST,
Spring 1985, at 9, 20.
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no black has ever been denied preferential admission to the
University of Texas School of Law, for example, or probably from
any other selective school, on the ground that he was not sufficiently
disadvantaged or, indeed, that he was exceptionally advantaged. It is
only necessary and always quite sufficient that he be black.
As the public became increasingly aware that "affirmative
action" meant racial preferences and that such preferences cannot be
justified as a remedy for disadvantage, defenders of racial
preferences were pressed to produce a new rationale. Possible
arguments for advantaging some individuals on the basis of
race-and therefore necessarily disadvantaging others-are few and
unpromising, however, and "diversity" has become the new
shibboleth. The effect has been to shift the offered justification from
aiding the preferred individual to aiding the discriminating
institution. Race is no more a proxy for any personal characteristic
relevant to higher education, however, than it is a proxy for
disadvantage; discrimination on the basis of race produces "diversity"
in nothing but race.
II. JUSTICE POWELL'S OPINION IN BAKKE

The "diversity" rationale for racial preference was given great
impetus by Justice Powell's tie-breaking opinion in the famous 1978
Bakke case,4 the Supreme Court's last word on racial preferences in
higher education. The case involved a challenge to the setting aside
of sixteen of 100 places for members of designated minority racial
groups in the grant of admission to the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis.' The issue, it would have seemed
to one without benefit of legal training, could not have been more
simple. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial
discrimination by any institution that receives federal funds,6 and the
school received federal funds.7 When race is involved in American
law, however, truth and honesty tend to go out the window. Only
four of the Justices-Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger

4. Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. See id. at 269-80.
6. Section 601 of Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat.
252,252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)).
7. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist--were willing to read the 1964
Act in good faith to mean what it says: no racial discrimination. This
willingness to abide by the statute's text made it unnecessary for
them to reach the question (which Congress and everyone else
thought had already been decided in Brown9) whether racial
discrimination by a state institution was also prohibited by the
Constitution. 10
Four other Justices-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun---skilled in legal reasoning, saw no reason to hold that a
statute prohibiting all racial discrimination should be read to prohibit
racial discrimination of which they did not disapprove.11 The
statute's language, "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin ... be subjected to
discrimination"' 2 -no doubt entirely clear to a mere layman-they
found (in an opinion signed by all four) to be "cryptic.' 3 After much
cogitation, therefore, the Brennan group concluded that the statute,
despite its terms, did not prohibit racial discrimination against
whites. 14 This reading required that they reach the constitutional
question, and the Constitution, they concluded, was equally
amenable to discrimination against whites. Although neither the
school, which had opened only ten years earlier, nor California had
ever segregated blacks, they found the school's use of racial
discrimination
justifiable
as
a "remedy"
for
"societal
discrimination."' 5
The opinion perhaps reaches its acme of
dishonesty with the statement that the school "considers on an
individual basis each applicant's personal history to determine
whether he or she has likely been disadvantaged by racial
& See i&2 at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part).
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
11. See id. at 324-25 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). For liberals, the higher morality of the pursuit of
racial equality easily overrides requirements of good faith; so good an end justifies all
means.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
13. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 340 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Except for Justice Brennan, each of the

four also wrote a separate opinion. See id. at 379 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 387 (opinion
of Marshall, J.); id at 402 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
14. See id. at 340 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id at 362 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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discrimination."' 6
This split of opinions left the decision up to Justice Powell, a
"moderate" and inveterate seeker of the middle way, even when
there was no middle way. 7 Like the Brennan Four, Justice Powell,
too, had difficulty understanding Title VI. Although it would seem
quite simple and direct, he found it "majestic in its sweep,"' 8 which,
like "cryptic," is a very bad sign. Unfortunately, Title VI's sweep was
not majestic enough, it turned out, to prohibit all racial
discrimination. As a result, Justice Powell was, like the Brennan
Four, forced to consider the constitutional question. Justice Powell,
however, vigorously insisted that discrimination against whites was
every bit as bad as discrimination against blacks, requiring "strict
scrutiny."' 9 But then, in a remarkable demonstration of his
"moderation," Justice Powell concluded in effect that just a little bit
of discrimination against whites would nonetheless be okay.
Reviewing the arguments offered for racial preferences, Justice
Powell rejected the "underrepresentation" argument as "facially
invalid."" It is indeed less an argument than an assertion of the
tautology that more members of the designated groups should be
preferentially admitted in order that more be admitted. Justice
Powell correctly pointed out that to make this argument is simply to
favor racial or ethnic "discrimination for its own sake."' He also
rejected the use of racial preferences to remedy "societal
discrimination," arguing-unfortunately incorrectly- that the Court
had allowed racial discrimination in the past only to remedy specific
past discrimination.' Finally, he rejected as unproven the argument
16. Id. at 377 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
17. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973) (Powell, 3.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). After arguing correctly that compulsory
integration could not be justified as a remedy for a past constitutional violation, Justice
Powell adopted exactly that justification for the lesser requirement of integration that he
favored. This opinion is analyzed in detail in LiNO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE:
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 185-97 (1976). As came
out in connection with Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court, Powell was,
unlike Bork, a liberal's idea of a good "conservative" Justice; that is, one who could be
counted on to vote for the liberal position when his vote really mattered.
18. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (opinion of Powell, J.).
19. See id. at 289-90 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("The guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment extend to all persons.... The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color.").
20. Id. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
21. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.).
22 See id. at 307-10 (opinion of Powell, 3.). Powell had himself pointed out in his
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that preferential admission to the medical school would z3result in
better medical services to members of the preferred groups.
Having first correctly rejected the underrepresentation argument
as simple racism, however, Justice Powell in effect then accepted it in
a slightly different form. While a school may not prefer blacks, for
example, simply to enroll more blacks, it may prefer blacks in order
to achieve a "diverse student body,"' 4 although the only "diversity"
thereby produced is the presence of more blacks. It has been hard
for anyone but Justice Powell to believe that racial discrimination to
obtain student "diversity" can meet the "strict scrutiny" test he
purported to apply. Even Professor Loewy, for example, is unwilling
to argue that it can.
Although a school's interest in a diverse student body permits it
to consider race in making admissions decisions, according to Justice
Powell, it may do so only as a "plus" factor and as one among many
other factors.26 This permissible limited use of race was illustrated,
Justice Powell believed, by the Harvard College admissions program,
a statement of which he quoted in his opinion 7 and reproduced as an
appendix.2? The Davis Medical School program was importantly
different from Harvard's program, in Justice Powell's view, and
invalid, because it supposedly used race not as a mere plus factor but
as a determining factor. Race is always the determining factor,
however, when it results in the admission of an applicant who would
not otherwise have been admitted. The only distinction between
programs purporting to use race as a plus factor and those using race
as a determining factor is the size of the gap in qualifications that
race will be permitted to overcome. In short, Powell purported to see
a distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of race that
few, if any, others-except, apparently, Professor Loewy-have been
able to see. Nevertheless, he established "diversity" as the new
buzzword for proponents of racial preferences.
As the Justices who would have upheld the Davis program
concurring and dissenting opinion in Keyes that the Court's school "desegregation"
decrees-requiring steps to increase racial integration-could not be justified as a remedy
for past segregation. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 224-26 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); GRAGLIA, supranote 17, at 185.
23. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11 (opinion of Powell, J.).
24. Id.at 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.).
25. See Loewy, supra note 1, at 1495 ("Although the question is not free from doubt, I
assume that diversity does not constitute a 'compelling' governmental interest.").
26. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.).
27. See id. at 316-17 (opinion of Powell, J.).
28. See id. at 321-24 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
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pointed out, the distinction Justice Powell purported to see between
the Davis and Harvard programs is illusory. Why setting aside seats
on the basis of race involves a prohibited "explicit racial
classification,"'29 but granting a plus on the same basis does not, is not
easy to see. Even on the counter-factual assumption that the
Harvard program "treats each applicant as an individual,"3
individuals of some races are treated better than others. If the evil of
the Davis program was, as Justice Powell said, that it denied Bakke
his "right to individualized consideration without regard to his
race,"'" it defies understanding how that evil is not also found in
another program that also distinguishes on the basis of race, even if
only to "tip the balance" in close cases.
Justice Powell's distinction between race as a plus factor and as a
determining factor, even if not nonexistent, is much too refined to be
useful in stating a meaningful rule of law. The result is that his
opinion is seen-as he himself recognized it might be-as little more
than an invitation to deviousness, concealment, and pretense. 32 The
truly significant point of Justice Powell's opinion, as the Brennan
group opinion gleefully pointed out, was that it condoned the use of
race in making admissions decisions.33 If race can be used at all in
admitting applicants to selective institutions, it will necessarily be
used as a major factor-to overcome large gaps-with whatever
degree of deviousness, concealment, and pretense may be required
because the desired minimum racial proportions can be achieved in
no other way.

29. Id at 319 (opinion of Powell, J.).
30. Id at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.).
31. Id at 318 n.52 (opinion of Powell, J.).
32. See id. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("[A] court would not assume that a
university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would
operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system."). Of course, it may
be noted again, a policy of openly using race as a plus factor is not a "facially
nondiscriminatory" policy. "Moderation" seems often to mean in practice a willingness to
live with contradiction.
33. The Brennan group stated:
[The several opinions] should not and must not mask the central meaning of
today's opinions: Government may take race into account when it acts not to
demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on
minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been
made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in
this area.
Id. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
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III. THE EVIL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Justice Powell's attempted justification of the use of racial

preferences in admissions to selective colleges and graduate schools
is not only incoherent but also seriously misguided.
Racial
preferences cannot, whatever the value of "a diverse student body,"
be reasonably thought to meet the "strict scrutiny" test that the
Court holds to be applicable to racial discrimination.
Less
legalistically, the costs of abandoning or qualifying the no-racialdiscrimination principle are too great to be acceptable. The central
issue presented by the use of racial preference is simply whether
government or government institutions may advantage some
individuals and therefore necessarily disadvantage others on the basis
of race. For most ordinary Americans, the answer could not be more
clear 4
Such discrimination is plainly inconsistent with the
democratic principle of individual worth, rather than worth by reason
of assignment to a particular racial group. This principle was made a
matter of constitutional law, everyone thought, by the Brown

decision in 195431 and ratified and extended by Congress in the great
Civil Rights Act of 1964.36 Few principles, if any, are considered
more valuable or to have a higher moral status." What could
possibly justify its abandonment?
The greatest cost of abandoning an official policy of racial
neutrality is simply that it reverses the educational effect of law.
Instead of insisting that race is irrelevant to a person's merit or
deserts, a belief essential to the maintenance of a multi-racial society,
it teaches that one's race is of central importance, determinative of
one's treatment by government. It therefore becomes appropriate
and necessary to form racial and ethnic organizations to fight for
racial advantage and defend against racial disadvantage. Race
34. See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, In Poll,Americans Reject Means but Not Ends of
Racial Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, § 1, at 1 (reporting that 69% of whites and
63% of blacks said race should not be a factor in college admissions).
35. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971,1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1994 & Supp. I11996)).
37. Consider the following statement by Professors Philip Kurland and Alexander
Bickel:
For at least a generation the lesson of the great decisions of this Court and the
lesson of contemporary history have been the same: discrimination on the basis
of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong and destructive of
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a
matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored.
Brief for the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith at 16, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235).
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consciousness is enhanced as race becomes a consideration in
virtually every activity. Racial conflict necessarily replaces racial
tolerance and cooperation.
The racially preferred inevitably come to see preferences as a
right and demand that they be extended. What was originally
introduced and justified as a temporary measure's will soon enter its
fifth decade, with increasingly outraged protests at any suggestion
that it be ended.3 9 If it is appropriate or necessary to exempt blacks,
for example, from meeting the requirements applicable to others in
admission to institutions of higher education, why should blacks not
also be exempt from other requirements? The tendency is to create a
general "black exemption" from the application of ordinary societal
standards, to come to accept that blacks are "just too different" to be
expected to conform to standards applicable to others. Such an
exemption for blacks, however, would leave all others with no choice
except to seek to escape association with blacks. To accept a policy
of racial preference is to accept the inevitability of racial separation
and abandon hope for an integrated society.
IV. THE MAGNITUDE OF ThE QUALIFICATIONS GAP

Apart from all questions of principle and overall and long-run
social effects, a policy of racial preferences must be rejected on
purely practical grounds-at least in the context of admission to
selective institutions of higher education. Racial preferences are an
attempt to overcome the fact that members of the preferred groups
are not, in general, competitive with whites (and Asians) in terms of
the ordinary academic admissions criteria. The crucial practical
consideration, usually ignored by proponents of racial preferences, is
the size of the gap in academic qualifications that must be overcome.
As Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray have pointed out, "data
about the core mechanism of affirmative action-the magnitudes of
the values assigned to group membership-are not part of the public

38. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("I yield to no one in
my earnest hope that the time will come when an 'affirmative action' program is
unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we could reach this
stage within a decade at the most."). Justice Blackmun's statement was made, of course,
more than 20 years ago.
39. When the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated an Atlanta program of racial
preferences in contracting, a black Atlanta councilman announced at a meeting of 300
black contractors, "'I am prepared to die for affirmative action, so help me God,'... to
[a] round of roaring amens." TAMAR JACOBY, SOMEONE ELSE'S HOUSE: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR INTEGRATION 453 (1998) (quoting Marvin Arrington).
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debate." 4
The inescapable fact is that the gap is very large, so large as to
require not merely the bending or shading, but the virtual
abandonment, of the usual admissions criteria if more than a very
small number of blacks is to be admitted to selective institutions. For
example, in 1994 the average black seventeen-year-old lagged behind
the average white seventeen-year-old by 3.9 years in reading and 3.4
years in math.41 In 1995, college-bound black seniors had an average
combined SAT score that was 202 points lower than that of the
average white student.42 Even blacks from families with an annual
income of $70,000 or more scored lower than whites from families
with an annual income under $10,000. 43
The situation as to graduate schools, and specifically law schools,
is at least equally grim. In the 1996-97 academic year, there were no
more than 103 blacks (and 224 Hispanics) in the country with an
LSAT score at or above the 83.5 percentile and a 3.25 GPA. 4 When
the standard is raised to the 92.3 percentile and a GPA of 3.50, the
number of blacks drops to sixteen (forty-five Hispanics). 45 An LSAT
score above the 92nd or even the 83rd percentile is a very good score,
good enough to gain admission to more than two-thirds of the
nation's law schools. Such scores are rarely good enough to gain
admission, however, to the nation's most selective-the top ten or
so-law schools. In the same 1996-97 year, the average student
receiving an offer of admission to the law school of the University of
California at Berkeley, for example, had an LSAT score at the 97.7
percentile and a GPA of 3.74.46 At this level, the number of blacks
40.

RICHARD

J. HERRNSTEIN

&

CHARLES

MURRAY,

THE

BELL

CURVE:

INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 449-50 (1994).
41. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK

AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE

357 (1997).

42. See id- at 398 tbl.3. In 1995, a score above 600 on the verbal SAT was made by
1.7% of the black test-takers, 9.6% of the whites, and 10.0% of the Asians; in the 700-andup bracket of the verbal, the ratio of whites to blacks was 49 to 1; in the 750-and-up
bracket in math, it was 89 to 1. See id. at 399 tbl.4. A score above 650 in math was made
by 2.0% of the blacks, 13.4% of the whites, and 25.8% of the Asians. See id. Asians, 3.5%
of the population in 1995, were 13% of all students scoring 700 or more on the verbal and
27% of those scoring 750 or more on the math. See id at 399. Of the 734 outstanding
students named Advanced Placement Scholars by the College Board in 1995, 29.7% were
Asian, 53.1% were non-Hispanic white, and 0.3% (2 students) were black. See id. at 399400.
43. See id.at 405 tbl.7.
44. See John E. Morris, Boalt Hall'sAffirmative Action Dilemma, AM. LAW., Nov.
1997, at 4, 5.
45. See id.
46. See id.
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(and to a lesser degree, Hispanics) is vanishingly small.
What this means is that all talk of achieving "a diverse student
body," that is, a substantial percentage of blacks, in a selective law
school by using race as a "plus" factor or to "tip the balance" in close
cases ignores reality. The only way in which such schools can and do
obtain an entering class that is more than one or two percent black4 7
is by "race-norming":
placing applications in separate stacks
according to the applicant's race-so that blacks compete only with
blacks-and selecting from the top of each stack until the desired
numbers are reached. By this process, hundreds of whites and Asians
can be passed over to reach and admit a lower-scoring black, and the
gap in average scores can be large. At the University of Texas Law
School before Hopwood,' for example, the presumptive reject score
for whites and Asians was higher than the presumptive admit score
for blacks and Mexican-Americans.4 9 A table given in a footnote to
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke shows that the situation was no
different in medical schools.50 The racially preferred were admitted
with an average MCAT score in the 31st percentile, while the average
of regular admittees was in the 76th percentile, and Bakke was twice
rejected-not even put on the waiting list-with an average score in
the 88th percentile.
V. THE HARVARD PREFERRED ADMISSIONS PROGRAM

Professor Loewy begins discussion of his proposal by
reproducing at length the statement of the "Harvard College
47. The Journalof Blacks in Higher Education'seditor calculated, on the basis of 1994

data, that without preference-i.e., using test scores alone to make admissions
decisions-the number of blacks in the nation's 25 most selective schools would drop from
6.3% to 1.5%. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 41, at 401.
48. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
49. See id. at 936.

50. The Table is reproduced, in part, below.
Class Entering in 1973:
MCAT (Percentiles)
Quanti Science Gen.

SGPA

OGPA

Verbal

Bakke
Average of
regular admittees
Average of special

3.44

3.46

96

94

97

72

3.51

3.49

81

76

83

69

Admittees

2.62

2.88

46

24

35

33

-tative

Infor.

Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,277 n.7 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Admissions Program" that Justice Powell appended to his Bakke
opinion as a model of a permissible racial preference program." The
statement is also a model, however, of the disingenuousness that
characterizes all defenses of racial preferences. It tells us, for
example, that" 'scholarly excellence' "is neither the sole nor" 'even
[the] predominant criterion'" for admission to Harvard,52 which will
no doubt come as a surprise to generations of Harvard applicants and
graduates. Indeed, the statement continues, if scholarly excellence
were the predominant criterion for admission to Harvard, the result
would be the loss of " 'a great deal of [Harvard's] vitality and
intellectual excellence,' ,53 as if scholarly and intellectual excellence
are not only different but incompatible.
Harvard has long sought student "diversity," the statement
points out: " 'Fifteen or twenty years ago, however, diversity meant
students from California, New York, and Massachusetts; city dwellers
and farm boys; violinists, painters and football players; biologists,
historians and classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics and
politicians. The result was that very few ethnic or racial minorities
attended Harvard College.' "54
How seeking these types of diversity-for example, students
from California, New York, and Massachusetts (and, presumably,
Mississippi and Alabama) -resulted in admitting few ethnic and
racial minorities is not explained and is inexplicable. The main
result, if not the purpose, of Harvard's quest for geographical
diversity, it might be noted, was that fewer students were admitted
from the Northeast and particularly New York City; this in turn
meant the admission of fewer Jews. Jews presented and continue to
present a serious "overrepresentation" problem, accounting for less
than three percent of the nation's population, but making up a
quarter to a third of the Harvard student body.5 5 If geographical
diversity-favored even more strongly, if anything, at Columbia Law
School, which is actually in New York City-produces any
educational advantage, I was unable to discern it while a student at
Columbia.
51. See Loewy, supra note 1, at 1483-86.
52 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard
College Admissions Program).
53. Id at 321 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard College
Admissions Program).
54. Id at 322 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard College
Admissions Program).
55. See Ron K. Unz, Some Minorities Are More Minor than Others, WALL ST. J., Nov.
16, 1998, at A38.
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" 'In recent years,' "the statement continues," 'Harvard College
has expanded the concept of diversity to include students from
disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups.' "56 Seeking here
to bolster the diversity rationale for racial preferences by blending it
with the remedy rationale, the statement necessarily adopts and
asserts the basic falsehood that racial preferences are meant to aid
the disadvantaged and that race is a proxy for disadvantage. One
may be confident that at Harvard, no less than was true at the Texas
Law School, no black is denied preferential admission on the ground
that he is not disadvantaged. Harvard, like Texas, necessarily seeks
the most highly qualified blacks it can find, and these are almost
always those who have been most advantaged-probably more
advantaged than many higher-scoring whites and Asians who are
rejected.
The central and crucial dishonesty in Harvard's defense of its
racial preference program, however, lies in the statement:
"In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant
that race has been a factor in some admission decisions.
When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large
middle group of applicants who are 'admissible' and
deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the
race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as
geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the
balance in other candidates' cases.'57
The gap between the average combined SAT scores of whites
and blacks is smaller at Harvard than at any other selective schoolfew applicants decline an invitation to Harvard-but it is still
substantial, about 100 points. 58 It almost surely is not the case at
Harvard, and even less so at other schools, that a large number of
blacks can be admitted-the usual objective is about ten percent,
with a minimum of five percent, of the entering class-by granting
preference only to blacks who fall within a "large middle group" of
more or less equally qualified applicants. It almost certainly will be
necessary, as it was at Texas, to admit blacks who would be
automatically rejected if they were white or Asian. "Geographic

56. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard
College Admissions Program).
57. Id. at 323 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.)(quoting Harvard College
Admissions Program).

58. See HERRNSTFIN & MURRAY, supra note 40, at 451 (reporting data for classes
entering in 1991 and 1992). The gap was close to 300 points at Berkeley. See id- (reporting

data from 1988).
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origin" or "life spent on a farm" (or being a child of a Harvard
alumnus-the much more important "legacy" preference) may be
used "to tip the balance" in some cases, 9 but when it comes to
comparing the academic qualifications of black applicants with white
and Asian applicants, very rarely is anything in or near balance.
No one even slightly aware of the facts as to the black-white gap
in the standard admissions criteria can read the concluding paragraph
of the Harvard statement-which is essentially the Loewy proposalwithout recognizing it as the wishful musings of a high-minded writer
of fiction:
"The Admissions Committee, with only a few places
left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between A, the
child of a successful black physician in an academic
community with promise of superior academic performance,
and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semiliterate parents whose academic achievement was lower but
who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an
apparently abiding interest in black power. If a good
number of black students much like A but few like B had
already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and
vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic
talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his
unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B.
Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or
experience not dependent upon race but sometimes
associated with it." 60
The black who grew up in "an inner-city ghetto" and applies to a
highly selective school is a famous mythical figure (he reappears in
Loewy's proposal) in discussions of racial preference programs. The
number of such blacks who can hope to apply to and compete at
Harvard is, in reality, very small to nonexistent. The reality, as
already noted, is that even the number of blacks from middle or
upper-middle class homes (the A's in the Harvard statement) who
can meet or come close to meeting Harvard's ordinary admission
standards is extremely small. The will to believe must be very strong
to accept that an "inner-city ghetto" black, should one appear, might
be refused preferential admission on the ground that "a good
number" like him had already been admitted. It is, if possible, even

59. It is unlikely, however, that a significant difference in scores can be seen on a
geographic basis.
60. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard
College Admissions Program) (emphasis added).
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more incredible that such an applicant might be denied admission in
order to admit a white applicant, even one with "extraordinary
artistic talent"-if necessary, a different applicant would be rejected.
Statements such as Harvard's have a superficial, if any, plausibility
only because the reality regarding racial differences is a taboo
subject; ignorance on the part of most readers can be assumed. The
distance between the real world and the world represented in the
Harvard statement is indicated by the fact, noted above, that literally
hundreds of white and Asian students are regularly passed over at
selective institutions to admit academically less-qualified, and usually
highly advantaged, blacks.
VI. LoEwy's REPLAY OF POWELL

Professor Loewy's proposed justification for racial preferences in
law school admission is essentially a replay of Justice Powell's
argument in Bakke and suffers from the same defects. First, it is not
credible that obtaining "a diverse student body," even as evaluated
by Loewy, can or should be found sufficient to meet the "strict
scrutiny" standard applicable to the practice of racial discrimination
by a state institution. Second, the size of the gap in academic
qualifications to be overcome leaves Loewy's proposal with very little
relevance to the problem selective law schools face.
Like the Harvard statement, Professor Loewy tries to convince
us-and perhaps has convinced himself-that it is "diversity" in
general, not just race, that is the subject of interest. In his scheme, he
says, race is not "the only, or even the most significant, feature
marking diversity. ' 61 But race is nonetheless important, he insists,
because the applicant pool could after all include those mythical
applicants crucial to proponents of racial preference, "black[s]
growing up in the inner city." 62 The applicant pool at selective law
schools, however, is much more likely to include only blacks from
advantaged backgrounds. They will nonetheless be preferentially
admitted, despite much lower credentials, because there is no other
way to achieve the desired racial result.
Professor Loewy is not candid in stating that race is not "the
only, or even the most significant" diversity factor.63 Except for race,
there would be no subject of "diversity," and Loewy would be spared
his exertions. Race is the only factor in dispute, the only factor giving
61. Loewy, supranote 1, at 1486.
62.d
63. Id.
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rise to litigation and grass roots movements to end preferences across
the country. Race is the only factor that can determine the fate of
university administrators. They can do fine without students from
the farm or California, but they must have black faces, and it matters
not at all whether they come from slums or Park Avenue. Loewy's
entire defense of his proposal is based on his willingness to pretend
that he does not know that this is so.
Professor Loewy claims to find great value in classroom racial
diversity. Like him, I have taught classes, large and small, with and
without black students. Unlike him, I have not experienced a
significant difference. Andrew Hacker, an ardent proponent of racial
preferences, who teaches extremely racially and ethnically mixed
classes at Queens College in New York City, reports a similar
experience. 61 Whatever the benefits from replacing some whites and
Asians with academically less-qualified blacks in selective schools,
however, the costs involved in abandoning an official policy of race
neutrality, especially considering the size of the gaps involved, greatly
outweigh them.
I also differ from Loewy in my unwillingness to make decisions
that severely affect the lives of other people on the basis of
essentially subjective considerations. He tells us, for example, (not
very credibly) that at some point in the process of admitting students
to a state university he would choose an Iranian or a Sikh over a
(presumably better-qualified) black.65 He doesn't mention, however,
the magnitude of the preference he would give. Exactly how many
points is being an Iranian worth? a Sikh? a Cambodian? a New
Zealander? Answering these questions requires a willingness to play
God that I am happy to avoid. Further, even if racial diversity is
thought to make a selective law school even better, surely that can be
true only when the difference in objective qualifications is small, and
it is not small when the admission of blacks is the issue.

64. See ANDREW HACKER, TWo NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 136 (1992).
65. See Loewy, supra note 1, at 1489. Presumably, he means to indicate an Iranian or
Sikh who comes close to meeting the ordinary (academic) admissions standards, but then a
black who comes even closer. The reality is, however, that such blacks are so rare that it is
inconceivable that one would be rejected in favor of an applicant of another race or
ethnicity. Being an Iranian or Sikh might trump being Irish, Italian, or Jewish, but not
being black.
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VII. WHEN RACIAL DISCRIMINATION Is NOT RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Racial discrimination by government is difficult, indeed for most
Americans impossible, to justify. At least it should require the most
extraordinary justification. Instead of undertaking the unappealing
task of attempting to show that racial discrimination by a state school
has such justification, Professor Loewy, exercising the prerogative of
a law professor, simply redefines racial discrimination. What would
appear to an ordinary person to be racial discrimination is not such at
all, he argues, and is therefore permissible if it has any justification.
He proceeds, in conventional legal fashion, by offering analogies,
albeit particularly inapt ones. If a football team "desperately needs"
a place kicker, it is not to be accused of improper discrimination, he
argues (quite persuasively), if it hires a merely competent one, even66
though truly excellent players are available to play other positions.
Similarly, a law school lacking a commercial law professor does not
discriminate improperly when it hires a competent one even though
superior constitutional law professors are available.67
So far so good. Suppose now that a law school that has granted
admission on the basis of GPA and LSAT scores to an overwhelming
proportion of women decides to fill the last two places by passing
over a group of women applicants in order to admit two lowerscoring men. "[I]t could be argued," Loewy graciously concedes, that
the higher scoring women "who were not admitted were
discriminated against because of their gender. ' 68 Indeed, less subtle
minds might even think that that could be asserted as a logical
certainty, as true by virtue of the meaning of words. But this, Loewy
informs us, would be a "shortsighted" way of looking at it.69 You see,
"being a man is a big plus" in this situation, just as being a place
kicker is a big plus to a team that needs a place kicker.70 The result is
that the admissions process is "not male-favoring," after all, but just
'71
"institution-favoring."
If anything is too clear for argument, surely it is that favoring a
male because he is a male-granting him a benefit denied a betterqualified female-does not cease to be "male-favoring" if the
discriminating institution has a reason to favor males, and even if the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1492.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1493.
Id.
Id.
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favoring might be beneficial, as Loewy claims, to some other females.
Equal protection, as we have often and rightly been told, is a matter
of the treatment of individuals, not groups. 72 Similarly, the football
team was not favoring place kickers or the law school favoring
commercial law professors any less simply because they had good
reasons for doing so. None of this sheds any light on the issue of
whether the law school may discriminate on the basis of sex or, more
to the point, race. If admitting blacks is thought to do more for a
school than admitting otherwise better-qualified whites and Asians,
that is a reason to favor blacks; it is not a reason to deny that the
school is discriminating (that is, classifying, distinguishing) on the
basis of race.
A black might be favored by a school, Loewy points out, for
some reason other than being black-for example, because he had
traveled around the world-and "we would have no problem with
[that] choice."'73 Loewy finds it strange that if, however, the black is
favored simply for being black-because "his blackness adds the
necessary diversity"--then "we would say that can't count. '74 This
argument indicates only that Loewy apparently has some difficulty in
keeping in mind that we treat racial discrimination, for very good
reasons, much more harshly than discrimination on other grounds. A
student's blackness, as such, adds only blackness -chromatic
diversity. Loewy's argument requires that it be used as a proxy for
something relevant to legal education.
Of the many serious
objections to this, surely the most important is that race might be
used as a proxy for many things, but a regime that insists upon
individual worth must demand that it not be.
Following Justice Powell in Bakke, Loewy argues that to set
aside a portion of a school's entering class for blacks would be racial
discrimination, but to use a black applicant's race as an admissions
qualification-an indicator of "one's potential contribution to the
betterment of the institution," a "race-neutral" standard-is not.75
Loewy is correct that to discriminate on the basis of potential
contribution is not race discrimination; to use race as a proxy for
potential contribution, however, very certainly is. By Loewy's
reasoning, of course, using whiteness as an admissions qualification
for the same reason would also seem not to be race discrimination.
But that is not so, Loewy argues with perfect illogic, because seeking
72.
73.
74.
75.

See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
Loewy, supra note 1, at 1494.
Id.
Id. at 1496.
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a "balance of ...ethnicity ...is reasonable" while seeking to

segregate is not.76 The fact that the justification may be appraised
differently in the two cases does not, unfortunately for Loewy's logic,

change the fact of discrimination.
Loewy sees support for his argument in a Supreme Court
decision indicating that it is permissible for school districts to assign
students to schools on the basis of race to increase integration.77 In
fact, the Court not only permits but requires racial discrimination

when it is supposedly necessary to undo the compulsory segregation
by law that was held unconstitutional in Brown.' Unlike Loewy,
however, the Court does not claim that what it permits or requires in
the name of school "desegregation" is not race discrimination.79
Loewy's confusion and illogic reach their crescendo with his final
thoughts. He reintroduces our familiar friend, the law school
applicant from an "all-black ghetto"-all black, that is, except for the
applicant who happens now to be a white woman. To admit the
woman rather than a better-qualified black would be, he tells us, to

make "a racial choice." 0 He had just told us, however, that she was
admitted because she had "'one of the most unique backgrounds' "81
the law school had ever seen, which is not a racial choice. Finally, in
his boldest move, he flatly states that although choosing the woman
"would be a racial choice," it "is not a racial classification."'

His

reasoning here is a bit obscure. Race, he notes, indicates a "'group
classification,' "which is not involved when an applicant is "analyzed
as an individual, not as a member of a racial group." 3 There is no
76. Id. at 1497-98.
77. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470-84 (1982) (striking
down a statewide initiative terminating mandatory busing for the purpose of integrating
public schools); Loewy, supra note 1, at 1498 (discussing Seattle).
78. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (striking down a
"freedom-of-choice" plan on the ground that it was not an efficacious method of
dismantling the dual system). See generally GRAGLIA, supra note 17, at 67-89 (discussing
the Court's school assignment cases).
79. See North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971)
(rejecting a "race neutral" standard). Loewy tells us, "[s]o far as we know, no racial,
ethnic, or gender litmus test was applied to any cabinet post" of the Clinton
administration. Loewy, supra note 1, at 1497. It seemed clear enough to most people,
however, that being a female was a qualification for the post of attorney general. I
personally know of a white male who was told that he was not eligible for a high position
because it had been set aside not only for a Hispanic, but for a Hispanic of a particular
national origin.
80. Loewy, supranote 1, at 1500.
81. Id.
8Z Id. at 1500-01.
83. Id. at 1501 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995)).

1524

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

quarreling with that; the only difficulty, of course, is that if her
admission was a racial choice, as he says, she was analyzed as a
member of a racial group and not as an individual. (Apart from this,
it is pure fiction to suggest that anyone is ever admitted to a highlyselective institution of higher education in preference to a betterqualified black who comes close to meeting the ordinary academic
admissions requirements.)
VIII. AN EXERCISE IN PRETENSE
Professor Loewy's defense of the use of racial preferences in
granting and denying admission to selective law schools suffers from
a more serious defect than incoherence. It is an exercise in pretense,
simply ignoring the facts that it is only race-primarily the perceived
need for black faces-that is the source of the problem under
discussion and that it is the magnitude of the gap in academic
qualifications between blacks and whites (and Asians) for admission
to selective law schools that is the source of the difficulty. Loewy
never specifies exactly how many points being black is worth in his
view, nor how large a gap in academic credentials he is willing to
overlook to obtain the alleged educational benefits of racial diversity.
His taking the Harvard program as his guide, however, with its talk of
"tipping the balance" and selecting among students in the "broad
middle" group, suggests that the gap he contemplates is very small.
The brutal reality, again, however, is that the gap between the
academic qualifications of blacks and those of whites and Asians is
not small. The grant of racial preference only to tip balances will
result in the admission of very few blacks to highly selective schools,
far fewer than is necessary to satisfy the need that is the only reason
we are even talking about "diversity." This need has nothing to do
with obtaining supposed educational benefits, but is only the felt
need of the schools for black faces for public relations and political
purposes, to escape the devastating charge of being "lily white"
(Asians apparently do not count). Unless, therefore, Loewy's
proposal is to be like Justice Powell's-merely a cover for fraud-his
earnest pleading and logical acrobatics will be to no avail.

